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article will preclude the plaintiff from asserting any other rights related
to the damages claimed at trial.s0 Subdivision (b) contains the same type
of protection concerning the defendants' rights of indemnification and
subrogation.81
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101: Defendant-doctor may be compelled by plaintiff to give
expert testimony during an examination before trial.
82
Recently, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, in Kane v. Randt,
held that a plaintiff could compel a defendant-doctor to give expert
testimony during an examination before trial in an action where a
medical standard was in issue, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had shown no inability or lack of intention to call another expert to
testify at trial. In Kane, a malpractice action against two doctors, plaintiffs claimed that defendants had improperly diagnosed a tumor in the
plaintiff-wife's spinal cord as multiple sclerosis. Pursuant to CPLR 3101
(a),8 3 which provides for discovery both before and during trial, the
plaintiffs sought to elicit expert testimony from the defendants during
a pre-trial examination and their request was granted.
Prior to passage of the CPLR, an expert's opinion generally was inadmissible in a pre-trial disclosure proceeding.8 4 However, in 1966, the
Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, in Kennelly v. St. Mary's Hospital,8 5 held that CPLR 3101 allows the admission of an expert's opinion
in an examination before trial where the expert is also the defendant.

The Kennelly holding was based upon McDermott v. Manhattan Eye,
80 This is to assure that article 14 is interpreted consistently with the Court of Appeals
decisions concerning the joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors. 2 N.Y. Ss. LAws
[1974] 1813 (McKinney). Meachem v. New York Cent. R.R., 8 N.Y.2d 293, 169 N.E.2d 913,
206 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1960); Barrett v. Third Ave. Ry., 45 N.Y. 628 (1871).
81 Since Dole is limited to affecting the laws of contribution, this subdivision provides
that in those situations in which the Court of Appeals would apply indemnification or
subrogation, article 14 is not to be interpreted as affecting those rights. See TwELF H
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, as
appearing in 2 N.Y. Sss. LAws [1974] 1813 (McKinney).
82 77 Misc. 2d 173, 352 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974).
88 CPLR 3101(a) provides, in part, that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all evidence
material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the
burden of proof, by: (1) a party, or the officer, director, member, agent or employee of
a party ......
84 See Reif v. Gebel, 246 App. Div. 776, 284 N.Y.S. 98 (2d Dep't 1935) (plaintiff
entitled to examine doctor as to the nature of injury for which he treated plaintiff, but
not as to cause of injury since such questioning called for an expert opinion); Bartlett v.
Sanford, 244 App. Div. 722, 278 N.Y.S. 578 (2d Dep't 1935); Pfaudler Permutit, Inc. v.
Stanley Steel Serv. Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 388, 212 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1961);
Murphy v. New York Cent. R.R., 17 Misc. 2d 1026, 188 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1959). See generally 3A WK:M
3101.05.
85 52 Misc. 2d 352, 275 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1966).
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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE

Earand ThroatHospital, 6 a case decided shortly after enactment of the
CPLR. In McDermott, the Court of Appeals held that a defendantdoctor may be questioned as an expert witness by the plaintiff at a
medical malpractice trial.87 The Kennelly court concluded that "evidence formerly inadmissible at trial, now admissible under the
McDermott holding, is therefore no longer inadmissible at an examination before trial."'8 To date, no appellate court has reversed the Kennelly decision.
The defendants in Kane asserted, however, that the plaintiffs could
not compel them to give expert testimony unless plaintiffs showed
either an inability to obtain other expert testimony or an intention not
to call expert witnesses.8 9 The court rejected this argument since it
could not "discern a viable basis for strictly limiting the McDermott
rule solely to cases where no other expert is available to the injured and
suing plaintiff."9' 0 Justice Harnett pointed out that it would be unfair
for the plaintiffs to commit themselves irrevocably at the pretrial stage
of litigation on the matter of calling expert witnesses at trial.91 Moreover, the court believed that neither defendant would suffer inconvenience or prejudice in testifying as an expert witness at an examination before trial. Two reasons were advanced by the court in support of
this belief. First, as parties to the action, CPLR 3101 required both defendants to appear at the examination before trial, even if they were
not required to testify as expert witnesses. Second, under McDermott,
either or both of the defendants could be called upon to give expert
testimony at trial.92
86 15

N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1964).

87 In the Court's view, a defendant-physician could be questioned as an expert witness
because his testimony, including that relating to his knowledge of local medical standards,
involved "as much matters of 'fact' as are the diagnosis and examination he made or the

treatment upon which he settled." Id. at 27, 203 N.EX2d at 473, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 71. One
additional reason advanced for the admission of such expert testimony was the difficulty

plaintiffs often encounter in persuading physicians to testify as experts at trials where the
defendant is a physician. Id.
88 52 Misc. 2d at 354, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
89 77 Misc. 2d at 174, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 395. In advancing this argument, the defendants
relied, in part, upon Forman v. Azzara, 23 App. Div. 2d 793, 259 N.YS.2d 120 (2d Dep't
1965), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 955, 212 N.E.2d 537, 265 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1966). In Forman, the
Second Department held that the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's request to have

the defendant-doctor testify as an expert at the trial, on the ground that expert testimony
had already been provided by the plaintiff's physician, was "harmless error" under the
circumstances. 23 App. Div. 2d at 795, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 122. Rather than limit the application of the McDermott rule, as the defendants in Kane contended, the Forman decision
supports the McDermott rule since the court acknowledged that the denial of the plaintiff's request to have the defendant-physician testify at the trial was error, although not

a sufficient cause for reversal.
9077 Misc. 2d at 176, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 177, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
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Although there exists little precedent directly supporting the
Kane decision,93 the "increasing expansion and liberalization of the
rules of disclosure" 94 in New York, as evidenced by the enactment of
CPLR article 3 1 ,1 affords substantial support for the court's conclusion.
Requiring a defendant-physician to testify as an expert witness at an
examination before trial may expose the defendant to searching inquiry,
thereby affording the plaintiff an early tactical advantage not otherwise
obtainable. However, as Justice Harnett noted, this
is the very purpose intended [by the CPLR], viz., to eliminate surprise at trial which often entails deflating one side by revealing in
full the issues and facts to be presented at trial. The sporting
theory of trial practice has long since been discredited in favor of
complete, open and mutual disclosure of evidence to be presented,
or required, at trial.96
Accordingly, limitations on pre-trial discovery which are merely formal,
97
and which do not serve a useful purpose, should be cast aside.
ARTICLE 52 -

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5222(b): Judgment creditor obtaining a restraining order held
subordinate to later assignee for benefit of creditors.
CPLR 5222(b) prohibits a person served with a restraining notice
from the "sale, assignment, transfer or interference with any property
in which he has an interest . . . until the judgment [against him] is
satisfied or vacated."' s By facilitating the collection of monetary judg93 Kennelly v. St. Mary's Hosp., 52 Misc. 2d 352, 275 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer
County 1966), involved the issue of requiring a defendant-physician to testify at an
examination before trial. See text accompanying note 85 supra. Unfortunately, the case
only represents trial court authority. By way of dictum, the court in Charlton v. Montefiore Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 153, 156 n.1, 256 N.Y.S.2d 219, 223 n.1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1965), stated that McDermott made it "obvious" that a defendant-physician could be
compelled to give expert testimony at an examination before trial.
94 3A WK&gM 3101.36.
95 In Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1st Dep't 1964),
the court observed that "the function of the disclosure devices [contained in CPLR article
31] is no longer limited to the perpetuation of testimony in those relatively infrequent
instances when there is impending danger that it will be lost before trial." Pre-trial
disclosure is designed "to advance the function of a trial [which is] to ascertain truth and
to accelerate the disposition of suits." 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, supp. commentary at 10
(1970). See also 3A WK&M 3101.01 and cases cited at footnote la therein.
98 77 Misc. 2d at 177, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
97 See Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 235 N.E.2d 430, 431,
288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1968); 3 WK&M 3101.36.
The Legislature did not distinguish between disclosure before and during trial in
enacting CPLR 3101. SixTH Ryp. 294. Given this lack of legislative intention to distinguish
the two phases of disclosure, the application of the McDermott rule to examinations
before trial appears to be all the more appropriate.
98 CPLR 5222(b).

